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The Proper Role of Community 
in Determining Criminal liability 
and Punishment 
Paul H. Robinson 
Criminal law protects us from the most egregious harms. It also allows 
government to wield the most serious intrusions on our personal liberties. 
Given these special responsibilities and special powers, it is particularly ap-
propriate that criminal law reflect the people's shared values-their shared 
values on what conduct deserves the condemnation of criminal conviction 
and their shared views on when and how much a violation of the criminal 
law should be punished (Kennedy, 2009, pp. 54-55) . 
But in this chapter I would like to talk about an alternative justifica-
tion, aside from its democratic value, for consulting the community's 
judgements of justice. Recent social science research has revealed that 
there is practical crime-control value in having the criminal law reflect 
community views. A criminal law that distributes criminal liability and 
punishment in ways that the community perceives as just gains moral 
credibility with the community, which translates into greater deference 
to, support for, and co-operation with the criminal justice system. In con-
trast, a criminal law that is seen as regularly doing injustice or failing to 
do justice loses moral credibility with the community and thereby reduces 
its influence. People are less likely to defer to it, to support it, to co-operate 
with it, or to acquiesce in its commands (see, in general, Robinson , 2008, 
pp. 175-184; Robinson & Darley, 2007, pp. 18-28; Robinson, Goodwin, & 
Reisig, 2010, pp. 1995-2011). Add to these powerful forces of social influ-
ence the general deterrence and incapacitation of dangerous persons that 
is inherent in what is seen as a just distribution of criminal liability and 
punis~ment, and it becomes difficult to justify adopting rules that con-
flict with community views. 
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In this paper I will describe some of the research that has revealed this 
practical value in having criminal law track people's shared judgements of 
justice, but I also will describe the potential dangers that exist in consider-
ing community views in the adjudication of individual cases , especially 
when community views are assumed to be those contained in newspaper or 
Internet reports. Finally, I will say a word about the current debates on the 
subject in the United States and in China. The points of debate in the two 
countries are quite different and illustrate additional advantages and dan-
gers of the approach. 
This informal essay is drawn from the research and conclusions of my 
recent book, Intuitions of justice and the Utility of Desert (Oxford, 2013). Its 
five hundred-plus pages and one hundred graphics bring together in an 
integrated whole my scholarship on the topic over the past two decades with 
nine co-authors. I urge readers to consult that volume for the details and 
documentation of the points that I discuss here. 
1. THE PRACTICAL VALUE IN FOLLOWING THE COMMUNITY'S 
JUDGEMENTS ABOUT JUSTICE 
The empirical studies examine two distinct questions. First, does knowl-
edge that criminal law rules regularly do injustice or fail to do justice de-
crease respect for the criminal law? Second, if so, does such decreased re-
spect reduce deference to the criminal justice system-specifically, reduced 
co-operation, compliance, and normative influence? 
History certainly suggests such a dynamic, at least for dramatic levels of 
disrespect. For example, the early Soviet criminal justice system was notori-
ously arbitrary and corrupt with little or no moral credibility amongst the 
general population. The compliance that it gained was through the coercion 
of a brutal and extensive police power. When those power centres weakened 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the crime rate increased dramatically. 
It was only the coercive influence of the state's threat that had given the 
system effect, and once that was gone, so too went its control. 
Empirical studies initially hinted, and more recent studies have con-
firmed, that this same relationship between the criminal justice system's 
moral credibility and its ability to gain deference applies not just to extreme 
situations but rather defines a general dynamic: the greater the system's · 
moral credibility, the greater its ability to gain deference, influence, and 
co-operation. 
We know that systems with public support have greater effect in gaining 
deference than systems with no public support and credibility with the 
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community, such as the early Soviet system. (Obviously, there are many 
other examples that one could use of discredited criminal justice systems.) 
What the recent studies have shown is that a marginal decrease in credibil-
ity will produce a marginal decrease in deference. (This is represented by 
the dashed line in the lower left of Figure 3.1.) This suggests that a system 
with moral credibility might further improve its ability to gain deference by 
further improving its reputation for doing justice and avoiding injustice, as 
the community perceives it. (This is represented by the dashed line in the 
upper right of Figure 3.1. In reality, of course, none of the lines on the 
graphic would be perfectly straight; we do not yet know their shape.) 
Why should it be the case that undermining the system's moral credibil-
ity undermines its crime-control effectiveness? The forces of social influence 
and internalised norms are potentially enormous. A criminal law that has 
earned moral credibility with the people can harness these powerful norma-
tive forces through a variety of mechanisms (for a more detailed discussion , 
see Robinson & Darley, 2007, pp. 18-31; Robinson, 2008, pp. 175-89). 
First, a criminal law with moral credibility can harness the power of 
stigmatisation. Many people will avoid breaking the law if doing so will 
stigmatise them and thereby endanger their personal and social relation-
ships. A criminal law that regularly punishes conduct that is seen as blame-
less or at least not deserving the condemnation of criminal liability will be 
unable to harness the power of stigmatisation. Second, a system that has 
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earned moral credibility with the people also can help avoid vigilantism. 
People will be less likely to take matters into their own hands if they have 
confidence that the system is trying hard to do justice. Third, a reputation 
for moral credibility also can avoid inspiring the kind of resistance and sub-
version that we see in criminal justice systems which have with poor repu-
tations. Such resistance and subversion can appear amongst any of the par-
ticipants in the system. Do victims report offences? Do potential witnesses 
come forward to help police and investigators? Do prosecutors and judges 
follow the legal rules, or do they feel free to make up their own? In systems 
with trial juries, do the jurors follow their legal jury instructions or substi-
tute their own judgment? Do offenders acquiesce in their liability and pun-
ishment, or do they focus instead on the injustice that they think is being 
done to them? Finally, the most powerful force that comes from a criminal 
justice system with moral credibility is its power to shape societal norms 
and to cause people to internalise those norms. If the criminal law has 
earned a reputation for doing justice, when the law criminalises some new 
form of conduct or makes some conduct a more serious offence than it had 
previously thought to be, the community assumes that this action means 
the conduct really is more condemnable. 
A variety of studies have this relationship (see Robinson & Darley, 2007, 
pp. 77- 91) , but let me show the results of just one recent study about this 
dynamic between the system's moral credibility and people's deference to it 
(see Robinson et al., 2010, pp. 1995-2011). Subjects were tested to deter-
mine their willingness to defer in the variety of ways just described: whether 
they would help investigators, or report an offence, or take criminalisation 
to mean that the conduct really was morally condemnable, and so on. With 
this baseline established, the subjects were then told of a variety of real 
cases in which the criminal justice system had done serious injustice or 
failed to do justice, not by accident but as the result of the liability rules 
formally adopted with the knowledge that they would have such unjust re-
sults. The testing confirmed that this information tended to disillusion the 
subjects about the criminal justice system. After some other activities to 
distract them, they were tested again on their views on deference and com-
pliance, and all had weakened. 
Table 3.1 provides the results (Robinson et al. , 2010, p. 2003). (The first 
column lists not the full text of the questions used but just a short-hand 
identification of the question.) 
A follow-up study used a slightly different methodology (Robinson et al., 
2010, pp. 2004-2008). Instead of the 'within-subjects design' used in the 
former study, it used a 'between-subjects design'. That is, instead of asking 
the same subjects their views before and after being 'disillusioned' about 
the criminal justice system, the study used separate groups. Some were 
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Table 3.1. Pre· and Post-Stimulation Averages 
Question Baseline Post· Significance 
1. Life sentence means offence 
conduct must be heinous 
2. Law prohibition means 
posting false comments must 
be condemnable 
3. High sentence for financial 
manoeuvre means condemnable 
4. Report removal of arrowhead 
5. Give found handgun to police 
6. Report dog violation to authorities 
7. Go back and report your mistake 
to gas station 
8. Go back and report your mistake 
to restaurant 
Table 3.2. 
average 
6.46 
6.14 
5.25 
5.93 
6.66 
5.15 
7.05 
7.15 
Question Baseline: No 
disillusionment 
1. Life sentence means heinous 6.46 ' 
2. Posting condemnable 6.14' 
3. Financial move condemnable 5.25' 
4. Report arrowhead 5.93' 
5. Turn in hand gun 6.66' 
6. Report dogs violation 5.15 ' 
7. Return to gas station 7.05 ' 
8. Return to restaurant 7.15' 
stimulation (p-value) 
avg. 
5.14 <.001 
5.76 <.07 
4.63 <.02 
5.14 <.01 
5.56 <.001 
4.59 <.01 
5.69 <.001 
5.71 <.001 
Low High 
disillusionment disillusionment 
6.59' 5.35b 
5.38b 5.59' ·b 
5.16' 4.34b 
5.65' 4.95° 
5.40b 4.32' 
4.75 '·b 4.43b 
6.63 ' 5.63b 
6.47b 5.84' 
Note: Where two cells on a row do not share the same letter, they are statistically significantly 
different. 
seriously disillusioned, some only mildly disillusioned, and some were not 
disillusioned at all. Then all subjects were asked the same deference and 
compliance questions. As Table 3.2 reflects, the study found that the extent 
of the disillusionment determined the extent to which the subjects would 
defer to the criminal justice system (Robinson et a!., 2010, p. 2007). 
These are actually a quite surprising result , if you think about it. When 
adult subjects are being tested in a study like this , they come to the study 
with an already-formed opinion about the moral credibility of the 
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criminal justice system. There is a limited amount that a researcher can 
do to shift this pre-existing view. But despite the fact that we can only 
slightly shift subjects' views, we nonetheless see a corresponding shift in 
the willingness of subjects to defer to and comply with the criminal jus· 
tice system. 
Another study did not collect new data but sought to determine whether 
the same dynamic was present in some of the very large data sets of previ-
ously collected survey data (Robinson et a!., 2010, pp. 2016-2023). A re-
gression analysis gave the results shown in Table 3.3 (Robinson eta!. , 2010, 
p. 2022). The moral credibility measure in the study explains more of the 
variance in the 'willingness to defer ' measure than any of the other mea-
sures. In fact, it is the only predictor that is statistically significant. 
One could summarise the conclusions of the empirical studies this way: 
Criminal law rules that deviate from the community's notions of justice are 
not cost-free, as has generally been assumed in the past. Rather, when the 
criminal law adopts rules or practices that produce criminal liability or 
punishment that is seen as unjust or as a failure of justice, the system suf-
fers a loss in effectiveness. To be most effective, the criminal justice system 
should try to distribute liability and punishment in accord with the shared 
judgements of justice of the community that it governs. In that way, it can 
bui ld moral credibility and, in turn, gain effectiveness by harnessing the 
power of social and normative influence. 
I have detailed elsewhere the kinds of instances in which I believe a 
society ought to deviate from the community's views to promote a soci-
etal good by seeking to change community views. But a criminal law can 
help change community views only if it has previously earned a reputa-
tion as a credible moral authority whose views should be given weight 
(see Robinson, 2011, pp. 186-202). 
Table 3.3. 
Variable 
Moral Credibility 
Male 
Age 
White 
Education 
Household Income 
Married 
Willingness to Defer to the Criminal Justice 
System in the Future 
Standardised Regression Coefficient Significance Level 
.265 .002 
-.072 .395 
- .128 .148 
.062 .476 
-.134 .144 
.017 .859 
.167 .069 
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2. IS IT POSSIBLE TO HAVE THE CRIMINAL LAW TRACK 
COMMUNITY VIEWS? 
Popular Punishment 
Section 2 suggests that there is practical value in having criminal law 
track the justice judgements of those it governs, but one can imagine, 
and some have expressly made, a variety of arguments for why this, even 
if it were theoretically true, simply is not practically possible: People's no-
tions of justice are simply too vague to be the basis for creating criminal 
law rules, and, even if they were not , people simply disagree about no-
tions of justice so it is not possible to determine a single community 
view. Indeed, some have argued that people's views about criminal liabil-
ity and punishment are not based on desert (moral blameworthiness) in 
any case but rather upon principles of deterrence and incapacitation of 
the dangerous. 
Notions of Desert as Hopelessly Vague 
A common objection to empirical desert as a distributive principle is its 
supposed vagueness (for a more detailed discussion, see Robinson & Darley, 
2007, pp. 32-35). Other critics may be willing to concede that moral blame-
worthiness is not a hopelessly vague concept, that it has some meaning, but 
would make a related but slightly different criticism: Desert cannot specify 
a particular amount of punishment that should be imposed; it can only iden-
tify a range of punishments that should not be imposed because such pun-
ishment would be seriously disproportionate. 
These complaints are based in part on a failure to appreciate the spe-
cific demands of desert and of people's intuitions about it. The confu-
sion arises in part from the failure to distinguish two distinct judge-
ments: setting the endpoint of the punishment continuum and, once 
that endpoint has been set, ordinally ranking cases along that contin-
uum. Every society must decide what punishment it will allow for its 
most egregious case, be it the death penalty or life imprisonment or fif. 
teen years. Once that endpoint is set, the distributive challenge that 
desert must guide is to dete~mine the relative blameworthiness of dif. 
ferent offenders-an ordinal ranking of offenders according to their 
relative blameworthiness. 
Because people make very nuanced judgements about the relative blame-
worthiness of different cases and because there is a limited punishment 
continuum (as punishment amount increases, the size of meaningfully dif-
ferent punishment units also increases), the result is a specific amount of 
punishment for each particular offence. That amount of punishment is not 
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the product of some magical connection between that violator's offence and 
the corresponding amount of punishment. Rather, it is the specific amount 
of punishment needed to set the offender's violation at its appropriate ordinal 
rank according to blamewor thiness, relative to all other offences. If the end-
point of the punishment continuum were changed, the appropriate punish-
ment for each offender would change accordingly. 
Those who complain that empirical desert is vague seem to assume (in-
correctly) that it must provide a universal, absolute amount of punishment 
as deserved for a given offence no matter the time or the jurisdiction. But 
the real demand of empirical desert, at least as laypersons see it , is to ensure 
that offenders of different blameworthiness are given appropriately differ-
ent amounts of punishment, each to receive an amount that reflects his or 
her blameworthiness relative to that of others. What critics see as vague-
ness or uncertainty about deserved punishment arises not from any vague-
ness in the ordinal ranking of offences according to offender blameworthi-
ness but rather arises from differences in the punishment-continuum 
endpoint that different societies adopt or that different people would want 
their society to adopt. However, once that endpoint is set, the distribution of 
punishment to offenders according to empirical desert suffers no vague-
ness or uncertainty. 
But this does not fully settle the vagueness complaints. Some writers 
argue that even ordinal ranking is something that can be done only in the 
vaguest terms; establishing specific rankings is impossible. The claim is that 
ranking offences according to blameworthiness is beyond the ability of peo-
ple's intuitions of justice. People can roughly distinguish between 'serious' 
and 'not serious' cases but cannot provide the nuance needed to do more. 
That claim is empirical, and empirically it is false. The evidence from a 
wide variety of studies is quite clear: Subjects display a great deal of nuance 
in their judgements of blameworthiness. Small changes in facts produce 
large and predictable changes in punishment. The empirical evidence sug-
gests that people take account of a wide variety of factors and often give 
them quite different effect in different situations. Alexis Durham offers 
this summary: 'Virtually without exception, citizens seem able to assign 
highly specific sentences for highly specific events' (Durham, 1993). Peo-
ple's intuitions of justice are not vague or simplistic but rather sophisticated 
and complex. 
Past research on lay intuitions of justice has included a wide range of 
topics, including such areas as the objective requirements of offences, com-
plicity, attempt, and causation; the culpability requirements of offences, li-
ability doctrines including mistake, accident, voluntary intoxication, and 
partial individualisation of reasonable person standard for negligence; the 
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justification doctrines of defensive force; law enforcement use of force; the 
excuse doctrines of insanity, immaturity, involuntary intoxication, and 
duress and other general defences such as entrapment; grading doctrines, 
such as those relating to sexual offences and homicide offences; and extra-
legal punishment factors such as remorse, forgiveness, hardship, and good-
deeds. Research of lay judgements of justice has also been undertaken to 
test empirical claims of criminal law theoretical literature, testing compet-
ing scholarly theories, such as those relating to justification defences and to 
offence of blackmail and testing claims about the nature of the shift from 
common law to modern American criminal codes. 
Hopeless Disagreement as to Notions of Desert 
In response to the suggestion that the criminal law should look to the com-
munity view, one might challenge: what community? Different communi-
ties may have different views. Which community view should the law look 
to? The short answer is this: Look to the community that will be governed 
by the law at issue. l f the question is the formulation of a provision of the 
state's criminal code, look to the state as the relevant community. If the 
question is the sentencing practice in a particular city, look to that city's 
residents. 
A related objection to using empirical desert as a distributive principle is 
that, even if individuals may have a clear and specific notion of what desert 
demands, people disagree amongst themselves . But, as with the claim that 
judgements of justice are hopelessly vague, this common wisdom simply 
does not match the empirical reality (for a more detailed discussion, see 
Robinson & Darley, 2007, pp. 36-38). The studies show that there can be 
widely shared intuitions about the relative blameworthiness of different 
cases, at least with regard to a 'core' of wrongdoing: physical aggression, 
taking property without consent, and deceit in exchanges. 
One recent study illustrates the striking extent of the agreement (Robin-
son & Kurzban, 2007, pp. 1866-1880). Subjects were asked to rank order 
twenty-four crime scenario descriptions according to the amount of pun-
ishment deserved. Despite the apparently complex and subjective nature of 
such desert judgements, the researchers found that the subjects had little 
difficulty performing the task and displayed an astounding level of agree-
ment in their ordinal ranking. 
A statistical measure of concordance is found in Kendall's W coefficient 
of concordance, in which 1.0 indicates perfect agreement and 0.0 indicates 
no agreement. In the study, the Kendall's W was 0.95, an astounding result. 
(One might expect to get a Kendall 's W of this magnitude if subjects were 
asked to judge an easy and objective task, such as judging the relative 
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brightness of different groupings of spots. When asked to perform more 
subjective or complex comparisons, such as asking travel magazine read-
ers to rank eight different travel destinations according to their level of 
safety, one gets a Kendall 's W of 0.52. When asking economists to rank the 
top twenty economics journals according to quality, one gets a Kendall's W 
of0.095.) 
Even more compelling, the astounding level of agreement cuts across all 
demographics. People from very different backgrounds, situations, and per-
spectives all agreed upon the relative blameworthiness of the twenty-four of-
fenders. Similar conclusions are found in cross-cultural studies. The level of 
agreement is strongest for those core wrongs with which criminal law pri-
marily concerns itself-physical aggression, taking property, and deception 
in exchanges-and becomes less pronounced as the nature of the offence 
moves farther from the core of wrongdoing. However, the data overwhelm-
ingly refute the common perception that there is never agreement as to judge-
ments of justice. 
Disagreements amongst people's judgements of justice do exist. People 
obviously disagree about many things relating to crime and punishment, as 
the endless public debates make clear. But some appearances of disagree-
ment are simply misleading. Poor testing methods will predictably under-
estimate the extent of agreement. When a test scenario is written ambigu-
ously so that different test participants perceive the facts differently, the 
existence of shared nuanced intuitions of justice itself will predict different 
judgements amongst the participants. So too, when a case in the headlines 
has social or political implications, its relevant facts commonly will be per-
ceived differently by different people. If people have different perceptions of 
the facts of a case, they are likely to have different views on the relative lia-
bility and punishment deserved. 
One might wonder why core judgements of justice are so widely shared. 
Whether due to some evolutionarily developed mechanism or to shared 
social learning, or some combination of the two, it is clear that the source of 
these intuitions is beyond even the powerful influences of culture or demo-
graphics. Because one does not see those differences in life experiences re-
flected in core intuitions, it follows that they must be somehow fixed and 
therefore will be resistant to attempts by social engineers to manipulate 
them, at least using the kinds of intrusions on personal autonomy that 
modern societies would permit. 
The point here is not to say that our existing intuitions of justice are good 
or bad. Rather, they are the reality, and effective social engineers must deal 
with the world as it exists, not as they wish it was. The criminal justice 
system must take account of these existing shared intuitions when in for-
mulates its criminal law rules. 
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People's Natural judgements about Punishment Are Based 
on Deterrence or Incapacitation, Not Desert 
Popular Punishment 
A third kind of criticism levelled against using empirical desert as the basis 
for distributing criminal liability and punishment is that people's punish-
ment judgements are not really based on desert but rather on factors relat· 
ing to effective deterrence or incapacitation. That is , when people ostensibly 
decide what punishment an offender should get, they are really deciding 
how much punishment is needed to deter or incapacitate. Having criminal 
law track people's judgements would not produce a desert distribution 
based on moral blameworthiness but a utilitarian crime-control distribution 
based on deterrence and dangerousness. Again, however, the view does not 
match the available data (for a more detailed discussion and for documenta-
tion, see Robinson & Darley, 2007, pp. 38-41). Studies examining the crite-
ria on which people rely on when making punishment judgements have 
found it to be desert- the offender's perceived moral blameworthiness. 
People's punishment judgements typically ignore deterrence or incapacita-
tion concerns. 
For example, one such study exploring whether desert or incapacitation 
are the driving force in laypersons' judging criminal liability and punish-
ment gave participants ten short descriptions of criminal cases, which were 
generated by combining five levels of case ser iousness (theft of a CD, theft of 
a valuable object, assault, homicide, and assassination) with two levels of 
criminal history (no prior history and a history of actions consistent with the 
crime committed). Participants were asked to assign a proper punishment 
to each case without any indication as to what that decision should be based 
upon, using a 7-point scale of punishment severity and a 13-point scale of 
criminal liability grades. Participants were thereafter asked to reconsider 
the scenarios and assign punishments from a just deserts perspective and 
from a incapacitation perspective (Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000). 
Punishment assignments based on just deserts were closely aligned 
with the original intuitive decisions, while punishments assigned using 
the incapacitation criteria were not. The study's authors conclude, 'What 
this suggests is that the default perspective of sentencing is indistinguish-
able from the just deserts perspective, [and both the default and explicit 
desert perspectives] are significantly different from the incapacitation per-
spective' (Darley et a!., 2000, p. 667). Other studies, which pitted justice 
against deterrence, reinforce this conclusion. People's intuitive default for 
assigning criminal liability and punishment is just deserts. While partici-
pants explicitly endorse deterrence justifications for punishment, they actu-
ally mteted out sentences 'from a strictly deservingness-based stance' (Carl-
smith, Darley & Robinson, 2002, p. 284). 
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3. RECONCEIVING THE CLASSIC RETRIBUTIVIST-UTILITARIAN DEBATE 
The research findings suggest an important twist in the classic 
punishment-theory debate. That debate has always s.ee~ tw.o opposing 
camps: On one side are the retributivists, who urge dtstnbutmg .pu.msh-
ment according to desert because they see doing justice as a value m ttself, 
and therefore needing no practical justification. On the other side are the 
crime-control utilitarians, who would distribute punishment so as to avoid 
future crime. They believe that punishment can be justified only by the 
benefits, specifically future cr ime reduction, that it can provide. Tradition· 
ally, this meant distribute punishment to optimise the deterrence of future 
crime or the rehabilitation or incapacitation of dangerous offenders (see, 
generally, Robinson, 2008, chapters 4-6). 
The two opposing camps would propose punishment of different people 
and different amounts, because they look to different criteria: The retribu-
tivists, wanting to do justice, would look to an offender 's moral blamewor-
thiness, as defined by moral philosophers. The utilitarians, who want to 
reduce crime, would look to what would most effectively deter, rehabilitate, 
or incapacitate potential offenders. Historically, these two camps have been 
seen as diametrically opposed and unavoidably in conflict. The two goals-
doing justice or fighting crime- commonly conflict, and, when they do, 
one must choose between them. But the recent empirical studies suggest 
that the picture is actually quite different. These two positions-the retrib-
utivists versus the utilitarians-may not be so entirely incompatible. 
As the recent studies suggest, the best way to fight crime may be to do 
justice. Thus, the utilitarians ought to be interested in 'empirical desert' 
(shared community judgements of justice). And the retributivists ought 
also to be interested in it. Empirical desert is not the transcendent deonto· 
logical desert of moral philosophers but, given the obvious difficulties of 
operationalising the latter (moral philosophers seem to disagree ~n many 1f 
not most issues), empirical desert may be the best feasible approxtmatwn of 
deontological desert that one can hope for in the real world. 
4. THE AMERICAN DEBATE: THE DISUTILITY OF INJUSTICE 
This perspective is consistent with recent developrr:ents. in the U~ited 
States. The American Law Institute, which is somethmg hke the natwnal 
academy for law in the United States, promulgated the Model Penal Code in 
1962. In the several decades following, about three-fourths of the states 
have since codified their criminal law in ways modelled after that code. The 
Model Code was amended a few years ago for the first time in the nearly 
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half century since its promulgation. The amendment revised the statutory 
section setting out the purposes of the code and how its provisions are to be 
interpreted. The new model provision sets doing justice-looking to the 
moral blameworthiness of the offender-as the primary and inviolable 
principle for determining who should be punished by how much. 1 
While this dramatic reform is consistent with the recent studies dis-
cussed above, some American scholars had reservations about the shift to 
moral blameworthiness. The concerns are of two sorts. One group was con-
cerned that the shift to focusing on desert was giving in to the 'retributiv-
ists' and was a defeat for those concerned about effective crime control 
(see Bottoms, 1995, pp. 39-41; Garland, 2001, pp. 13-14). But the empirical 
studies discussed above can help allay those concerns, because they show 
that doing justice in the community's view can actually improve the crimi-
nallaw's crime-control effectiveness. By building the criminal law's moral 
credibility with the community, it can better harness the powerful forces of 
social and normative influence. (As I develop in my book, Distributive Prin-
ciples of Criminal Law, crime-control utilitarians should be comfortable 
with empirical desert as a distributive principle not only because of its 
crime-control benefits but also because of the comparative weakness of the 
crime· control benefits of the traditional principles of deterrence and inca-
pacitation; see generally Robinson, 2008, chapters 4, 6). 
But another group of American scholars had a very different concern. 
They feared that deference to community views of justice would make the 
criminal justice system extremely punitive, which they would very much 
disapprove. They noted, for example, that democratic action had brought 
about a series of modern crime-control programs that seemed, in their 
view, to impose harsh and unjust sentences. They feared that giving a 
greater deference to community views would make the criminal law even 
more draconian than it already was (see Kaplow & Shavell , 2001; Luna, 
2003, pp. 223-237). 
I understand and sympathise with this view, but let me explain why I 
think it is seriously misguided. These scholars are correct in pointing out a 
variety of modern criminal law rules that do in fact generate serious injus-
tice, but they are wrong to think that these rules reflect shared community 
notions of justice. On the contrary, these modern rules were designed not 
to do justice but rather were efforts to increase crime-control without regard 
to whether they did injustice. That is, when legislatures adopted these kinds 
of programs, they did so not because the community saw these rules as just 
but rather because crime-control experts had told legislators that these pro-
gram~would reduce crime. 
Let me give six examples of the kinds of modern programs that are at 
issue here-each adopted because it was thought to improve the control of 
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crime (for a more detailed discussion and for documentation, see Robinson 
et al. , 2010, pp. 1949-1961). The 'three strikes' doctrine provides for long-
prison terms for an offender who has two previous criminal convictions. 
High penalties for low-level drug offences are thought to be useful in pro-
viding an added deterrence. Many jurisdictions have adopted rules that 
reduce the age at which an offender is prosecuted as an adult and thus is 
subjected to the full force of criminal penalties. Many jurisdictions have 
narrowed or eliminated the insanity defence, as a way of taking better con-
trol over people whose mental illness can cause harm. Some jurisdictions 
use what are called 'strict liability' offences, which do not require that the 
offender had a culpable state of mind towards the offence-that is, they do 
not require a showing that the offender committed the offence purposely, 
knowingly, or recklessly. Finally, the 'felony murder rule' provides that 
anyone causing a death even entirely accidentally during the commission of 
a felony is liable for murder, the most serious form of homicide, which nor· 
mally requires that the offender intentionally caused the death. Not every 
application of these doctrines produces injustice, but the doctrines are for-
mulated such that unjust sentences-punishment more than an offender 
deserves-are not uncommon. 
Recent empirical studies show that the criminal liability and punish· 
ment generated by these doctrines generate results that seriously conflict 
with peoples' shared intuitions of justice. In one recent study, subjects 
were asked to rate the relative blameworthiness of a variety of cases, each 
of which dealt with one of the six crime-control doctr ines just listed 
(Robinson et al., 2010, pp. 1961-1979) . (Each of the cases used was a real 
case, in which the doctrine was applied as it was designed to be.) The 
subjects' views were then compared to the punishment judgements re· 
fleeted in the legal rules. Figure 3.2 shows the results (Robinson et al., 
2010, p. 1973) . 
The twelve cases listed on the left in Figure 3.2 are what might be called 
'milestone cases'. They provide a range of cases that mark out points of 
comparison along the full length of the continuum of offence seriousness 
and punishment. The solid lines from the cases to the centre line show how 
the subjects 'sentenced' each of these cases. Note that punishment scale 
provided is exponential rather than linear. Moving from 0 to @ triples the 
punishment (from two months to six months) ; just as moving from @} to 6 
triples the punishment (from one year to three years). (This reflects both 
the approach of criminal code offence grading schemes and the way that 
laypersons think about punishment differences: The more serious the pun· 
ishment, the larger the noticeably different unit of punishment.) 
The cases on the right are the 'test offences', each relying upon one of the 
modern crime-control doctrines noted above. The subjects 'sentenced' the 
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12. Ambush Killing 
11 . Stabbing 
10. Accidental Mauling by Pit Bulls 
9. Clubbing During Robbery 
8. Attempted Robbery at Gas Station 
7. Stitches After Soccer Game 
6. Slap & Bruising at Record Store 
5. Microwave from House 
4. Clock Radio from Car 
2. Wolf Hallucination 
3. Whole Pies from Buffet 
1. Umbrella Mistake 
Subjects' sentence ___ _ 
Law's sentence -- .. . . -.. -· . 
Figure 3.2 
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offender in these cases to sentences at various points along that punish-
ment continuum-scattered amongst the various 'milestone cases'. For ex-
ample, the subjects saw the Haas case (a strict liability case) as more serious 
than the theft of a radio from a car but less serious than the theft of the 
microwave from a house. The solid lines on the right (from each case to the 
punishment scale) show the amount of punishment that the subjects would 
impose in each of the test cases. 
The important point here is to look at the dotted lines on the right. The 
dotted lines show the punishment that the law would and did actually 
impose in these cases. Compare each dotted line with the solid line associ-
ated with the same case. As you see, the law's punishment is dramatically 
higher than that imposed by the study's subjects. The difference is even 
more striking when you take into account that the punishment continuum 
used here is exponential. The large difference in slope between the solid 
line and the dotted line for each test case shows that the punishment that 
the law imposes is commonly many times higher than what study's sub-
jects would impose. 
How could such a discrepancy occur in a democracy, where the laws are 
enacted by elected representatives of the people? This conflict of criminal 
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law with community judgements of justice arises for two reasons (for a 
more detailed discussion and for documentation, see Robinson et al., 2010, 
pp. 1979-1995). First, as noted above, the doctrines that generate these re-
su lts have been adopted because they were thought to reduce crime. That is, 
the lawmakers were intentionally sacrificing justice because they were told 
it that would reduce crime. Second, there is an unfortunate distortion effect 
in American politics when it comes to legislation relating to crime. Politi-
cians have a tendency to exaggerate the seriousness of the crime problem 
and to be overly optimistic that legislation will have an effect in reducing 
crime. It is also common that legislators use crime-related legislation as a 
vehicle to make a reputation with the voters to get elected, even if the legis-
lation really will not reduce crime. 
Another misleading source of community views are so-called public 
opinion surveys, which purport to show public support for some political 
initiative. But these surveys are more often a test of subjects' politics than of 
their judgements of justice. When asked questions about abstract policies, 
the surveys get the test subjects' allegiance or rejection of the politics behind 
the policy. If you ask people whether they support 'three strikes' legislation, 
for example, those who count themselves as conservative will support the 
issue because they know it to be part of the conservative political view. But 
we know from more responsible testing than 'public opinion' polls, as with 
the laboratory experiment reported above, that conservatives and liberals 
will in fact see real 'three strikes' cases as dramatically Jess serious than the 
law treats them, contradicting the premise of the three-strikes policy. 
The original point of the discussion here was some scholars ' fear that 
shifting the criminal law to track community views would create draconian 
rules. In truth, however, the modern programs producing the unjust sen-
tences to which these people object-three strikes, felony murder, and so 
on-do not reflect community views of justice but rather conflict with 
them. Relying upon community views of justice would not encourage dra-
conian punishments but rather would lead criminal law to discard rules, 
like these six, that produce what the community sees as unjust punish-
ment. To worry that community views are draconian is to confuse people's 
judgements of justice with politicians' rhetoric. The empirical studies on 
empirical desert could in fact serve as an important antidote to false politi-
cal claims about what the community thinks is just. 
Moreover, because people do not have fixed intuitions about the general 
severity of punishment-different societies can and do have noticeably dif-
ferent severity levels-reformers could over time shift a society's expecta-
tions towards lower severity. It would be a mistake to try to do so abruptly, 
for it might undercut moral credibility, but one could regularly reduce pun-
ishment levels across the board by an amount that would seem trivial in 
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itself. For example , as an effort to reduce the overall cost of imprisonment 
on strained state budgets, one could reduce all sentences by 5 per cent, and 
could do so repeatedly over many years. 
5. THE CHINESE DEBATE: THE DANGERS OF CONSIDERING COMMUNITY 
VIEWS IN THE DISPOSITION OF INDIVIDUAL CASES 
I recently had occasion to give a series of lectures in China about these 
issues, including the idea of having criminal law track community views. 
There is serious debate in China about these issues, but, interestingly, it is 
along quite different lines than those of the American debate. One group of 
Chinese academics very much welcomes the notion of having criminal law 
based upon 'empirical desert'-that is, derived from social science studies 
of shared lay judgements of justice. Chinese culture has had a long tradi-
tion of seeing wisdom in the people. It is said to be a classic Confucian 
theme. But that tradition has been used, these academics worry, to justify 
the increasingly common practice by newspapers or Internet bloggers or 
others to undertake a public campaign for or against a particular defendant 
in a current case. 
When a case attracts the attention of a newspaper or Internet blogger, 
who presses a public campaign of hostility or of favouritism, one might 
conclude that 'the people's view' is important to follow, that prosecutors 
and judges ought to defer to the expressions of views in such public cam-
paigns. But ifbuilding the moral credibility of the criminal law is the goal, 
giving influence to these kinds of public campaigns is dangerous because 
it invites a result that-longer term, after passions cool-may be seen as 
unjust and thus serve to undermine the system's long-term reputation with 
the community. 
In one case, for example, the defendant, Fu Zhongtao, struck and killed 
a ten-year-old girl (Zhiguang & Guangyu, 2005). He was driving a Lincoln 
sedan, which showed him to be a rich person. The media played on the 
people's anti-rich bias and gave great attention to the case, fanning a public 
outrage over the offence. Fu was sentenced to death and executed. (It was 
only later revealed that Fu bought the car second hand and that it was 
about to be scrapped, a fact omitted from the media coverage before the 
execution.) 
In another case, the Police Commissioner Zhang Jinzhu at a police sta-
tion in Zhengzhou, Henan Province, was driving drunk and hit a person on 
a bic~cle. He drove away from the scene, intending not to report it. Un-
known to him, the cyclist was stuck under his car and his driving away 
caused the cyclist's death. Because of a standing concern about official 
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misconduct, the media continuously featured the case in its headlines, 
whipping up anger in the community and demanding that Zhang be given 
the death penalty. There was no indication that Zhang knew the cyclist was 
under his car and normally would be sentenced to no more than seven years 
for negligent homicide, but the courts bowed to public pressure and sen-
tenced him to death (Zhiguang & Guangyu, 2005). 
Let me suggest a variety of ways in which public campaigns about a par-
ticular case can promote results that later, upon closer examination and 
more thoughtful reflection, may be seen as unjust. First, the public reaction 
to a case may depend upon false or incomplete reporting of the true facts . 
The account of a case given in a newspaper article or an Internet blog is 
necessarily only a partial presentation of the facts presented at a fair trial, 
where both prosecution and defence have an opportunity to tell their full 
story. And when newspapers or bloggers give their shortened version of the 
facts, it is common for them to select those facts consistent with their point 
of view and to omit facts that are inconsistent with it. A distorted presenta-
tion of the case facts can produce only a distorted view of the liability and 
punishment that is deserved. 2 
Public influence in deciding individual cases also is a problem because 
some people may be biased in their judgements because of a defendant's 
ethnicity, religion , age, gender, political views, family affiliations, race, 
social background, sexual orientation, or, as in the Fu case, apparent eco-
nomic status. Further, we know from social science research that even if 
one tries to be unbiased in one's judgements, it is sometimes difficult to do 
so. People tend to be more sympathetic to defendants who are like them-
selves, for example, and are less sympathetic to defendants who are differ-
ent from themselves . The beauty of relying upon empirical research to de-
termine community judgements of justice is that we can determine those 
judgements independent of potential biases by using testing methods that 
exclude the personal characteristics of a defendant that might bias people's 
judgement. We can get the true principles of justice that guide people's as-
sessment of blameworthiness, insulated from the unfortunate biases that 
may exist with regard to a particular defendant. 
An even greater problem in having public views influence individual 
cases is the extent to which this has a defendant's liability and punishment 
depend upon his or her good or bad luck-in avoiding or in attracting news-
paper or blogger attention. A defendant's criminal liability and punishment 
ought to depend upon what he or she has done and his or her blameworthi-
ness for doing it. It ought not to depend upon whether the case happens to 
attract or escape media attention, especially if the media attention is the 
result of political or social influence by a victim's family or friends or is 
prompted by the political or social views or characteristics of a defendant. 
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A final difficulty with giving influence to public campaigns for or against 
a particular defendant is that they tend to focus on the defendant at hand in 
isolation and fail to put the case in the broader perspective of other simi la r 
cases. We know from social science research that people have very nuanced 
and sophisticated judgements about the relative blameworthiness of differ-
ent cases and feel strongly that greater punishment ought to be imposed 
where there is greater blameworthiness and that less punishment ought to 
be imposed where there is less blameworthiness . Indeed, it is this relative 
blameworthiness judgment that is at the core of a criminal justice system's 
reputation for doing justice. 
It is getting these judgements of relative blameworthiness correct that 
is essential to the criminal justice system earning long-term moral credi-
bility with the community it governs. Yet it is just that judgment-of rela-
tive blameworthiness-that is most commonly distorted when there is a 
public campaign about a particular case. A common effect of such a cam-
paign is to exaggerate the seriousness of the case as against other cases , 
producing a punishment that later, after passions have cooled, will stand 
out as excessive. 
Many Chinese academics welcome the notion of empirical desert as the 
basis for criminal law rules because they see it as a way to give deference to 
the traditional 'wisdom of the people' while avoiding the dangers that they 
see in the ad hoc public campaigns like those above-a view that seems to 
make good sense. 
The practical value of following people's views of justice, described in 
Section 2, exists only if those views accurately reflect the judgements of the 
community upon thoughtful reflection. The point, recall, is to build the rep-
utation of the criminal justice system as being an institution that the com-
munity can rely upon to do justice and avoid injustice. This means that there 
is danger in following the views of an unrepresentative minority of the com-
munity or in following views formed in passion and emotion that will later 
be seen as unjust after the heat of the moment passes. To build a reputation 
for being just, the criminal justice system must not simply do what it thinks 
is popular in the case at hand but must also aim to be proud of what it has 
done in all its past cases. 
To summarise, community views ought to be influential in setting the 
rules for criminal liability and punishment but not in deciding individual 
cases. Once community views have been used to set the criminal law's 
rules, those rules ought to be applied the same to all offenders in all 
cases. 
However, there are academics in China who have an important alter-
ative view of the situation. They would support giving deference to com-
munity views in individual cases, even given its dangers. They argue that, 
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given how corrupt and discredited the crimin.al. jus~ice s~stem is, some-
times the only way of getting justice or of avmdmg lllJUStlce 1s to look to 
public campaigns that rally public support against the normal work~ngs of 
the official system. Left to its own devices, they argue, the offioal cnmmal 
justice system commonly will look not to what is just but rather to what the 
political or otherwise well-connected powers find to be exped.1ent. The 
public voice is the only available means of keeping those corruptmg forces 
in check. 
In one recent case, for example, a young man, Xu Ting, found that an 
ATM machine from which he withdrew a thousand yuan only reduced his 
bank balance by one yuan. He then took advantage of the malfunction and 
withdrew a total of 175 thousand yuan (US$27,750). He was convicted and 
sentenced to life in prison, but after a public outcry, his sentence was 
changed to five years in prison.3 In another case, a local official, Deng 
Guida, and his deputy were drunk at the Dream Fantasy City bath centre. 
He demanded sex from a local worker who was washing clothes in a room. 
When she explained that she was not a sex worker, he became angry, chased 
her, and verbally and physically assaulted her. The victim finally stabbed 
him with a fruit knife to stop his aggression, killing him, and was charged 
with murder. The local authority tried to censor many of the details of the 
case because of its embarrassment over the official being very drunk in a 
place selling sex. When the facts did come out, the public w~s highly suspi-
cious of the case and argued strongly that the victim acted m self-defence. 
While initially charged with murder, the woman was ultimately convict:d 
of intentionally inflicting injury but exempt from punishment (Baoxm, 
2009). . . . . 
Clearly, there are special difficulties with a cnmmal JUStlces~ste~ that, 
due to corruption or illicit political influence, will regularly do lllJUStlce and 
fail to do justice. At some point do the normal dangers of direct community 
influence in individual cases become the lesser of the two evils? One would 
hope that a society could find a way to move towards ~ more just system 
rather than having to suffer the dangers of ad hoc pubhc mfluence m mdl-
vidual cases. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Community views of justice have an important role to play in a~sessi~g 
criminal liability and punishment. Normally, that important role 1s n~t ~~ 
pressuring prosecutors or judges to influence the a~judication of an m.d~­
vidual case. Rather, the community's views, as estabhshed through empm· 
cal research, ought to be to set the basic criminal law rules for liability and 
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punishment, and those rules ought to be applied the same to all defen-
dants. A defendant should be judged by what he or she has done and with 
what culpability and capacity. The defendant's liability and punishment 
ought not to depend on his or her good or bad luck in avoiding or attracting 
publicity by newspapers, bloggers, or others. 
If the criminal justice system can earn a reputation for trying to be just 
in all its cases, its greater moral credibility with the community will in-
crease its power to gain deference, co-operation, and acquiescence, which 
will increase its crime-control effectiveness. That is, the best way of fighting 
crime is by being devoted to doing justice. 
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NOTES 
1. Model Penal Code §1.02 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (emphasis added) : 
(2) The general purposes of the provisions governing sentencing and correc· 
tions, to be discharged by the many official actors within the sentencing 
and corrections system, are: 
(a) in decisions affecting the sentencing and correction of individual offenders: 
(i) to render punishment within a range of severity proportionate to the grav-
ity of offences, the harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness 
of offenders; 
(ii) when possible with realistic prospect of success, to serve goals of of-
fender rehabilitation, general deterrence, incapacitation of dangerous 
offenders, and restoration of crime victims and communities, pro-
vided that these goals a1·e pursued within the boundaries of sentence sever-
ity permitted in subsection (a)(i) ; and 
(iii) to render sentences no more severe than necessary to achieve the ap· 
plicable purposes from subsections (a)(i) and (ii) ; ... 
2. For example, note that the factual error in representing Fu as a rich person or, in 
note 28 infra, the attempt of authorities to hide the location of the killing in the 
stabbing case. 
3. The First Instance Written Judgment ofXuting Case, http:jjwenku.baidu.comjviewj 
b155a9d484254b35eefd3464.html.2012-10-ll; The Final Instance Written judgment 
of Xuting Case, http:/ jwww.ycxy.comjcnjlwj2 010/2624 7.html,2012 -10-11. 
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